Gender, Implicit Bias, and Philosophical Methodology
Abstract
The inclusion of more women’s works on introductory syllabi in philosophy is one possible strategy to increase the likelihood that women choose to study philosophy. One objection to this strategy is that attention to the identity of authors is detrimental to other pedagogical goals such as offering selections on the basis of their philosophical quality rather than the identities of their authors. I suggest the extent to which one perceives it important to include women on introductory syllabi, one’s “gender perception,” may be affected by one’s unchosen habits of moral perception; I appeal to Peggy DesAutel’s two types of moral perceiver to suggest that advocates and critics of more inclusive curriculum do not mere differ in values, but have biases which result in receptivity to different reasons to change the way we introduce philosophy to newcomers. Inclusive curriculum may benefit all students. I suggest representing the importance of those benefits to philosophers whose habits of moral perception incline them to principled rules and fairness rather than affective considerations.
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